The misevaluation of risk in securitized financial products is central to understanding the financial crisis of 2007-8. This paper characterizes the evolution of factors affecting collateralized debt obligations based on subprime mortgages. A key feature of subprimemortgage backed indices is that they are distinct in their vintage of issuance. Using a latent factor framework that incorporates this vintage effect, we show the increasing importance of a common factor on more senior tranches during the crisis. We examine this common factor and its relationship with spreads. We estimate the effects on the common factor of the financial crisis.
Introduction
Securities based on subprime mortgages played a central role in the Financial Crisis of [2007] [2008] . The shortcomings of models for pricing these securities became apparent when real estate prices started to fall and mortgages became delinquent. Di¢ culties valuing these securities led to widespread problems trading them, (Dwyer and Tkac, 2011) .
The period leading up to the crisis was one of dramatic growth in asset backed securities and structured …nancial products. These products were tranched and rated and acquired by investors across the world. Chiesa (2008) shows that pooled and tranched securities can generate optimal risk transfer, although one rationale for the issuance of pooled and tranched securities is an informational advantage about underlying asset quality enjoyed by informed sellers (DeMarzo, 2005) . Increased demand for structured securities led to an expansion in the range of underlying assets (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009 ) and the creation of structured securities based on subprime mortgages increased dramatically. Mian and Su… (2009) provide evidence that an increased demand for these products a¤ected the market for subprime mortgages by resulting in less stringent lending criteria and contributing to their subsequent growth.
The spread of this crisis from a relatively small sector of the …nancial system across markets and international borders resulted in widespread …nancial distress. 1 Among other e¤ects, banks in much of the world su¤ered substantial losses followed by serious retrenchment and restructuring. The turbulence and ensuing lack of con…dence spread to other asset markets and the real economy. Brunnermeier (2009), Dwyer and Tkac (2009) and others document the evolution and spread of the crisis and the role of subprime-mortgage backed securities in it.
The misperception and misevaluation of risk in structured …nancial products is central to many explanations of the …nancial crisis. This may have arisen partly due to the failure of some market participants to di¤erentiate between the risk of AAA-rated tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and AAA-rated corporate bonds (Brennan, Hein and Poon, 2009) . In addition to possible mispricing, the valuation of CDO tranches is par-ticularly problematic in the event of widespread defaults (Smithson, 2009 ), a feature not apparent before defaults increased in 2007. Valuation models have four key inputs: default rates, prepayment risk, recovery rates and default correlations. Problems estimating the last two were important during the …nancial crisis. Default correlations inevitably are based on historical data and were underestimated based on a period of increasing house prices and economic expansion. As default correlations increase, the probability of observing large-scale defaults also increases, causing the prices of senior CDO tranches to fall. Estimates of recovery rates also were a¤ected. Consequently, the risk priced in the di¤erent CDO tranches was underestimated. Coval, Jubek and Sta¤ord (2009) analyze the risk inherent in the securitization process and in particular how risk migrates to higher-rated tranches in the event of increasing importance of a large common shock such as falling house prices.
A better understanding of the factors underlying price changes in these subprime-mortgage backed assets is important for understanding their role in the crisis. We characterize the driving forces behind the decreases in these securities' prices. In earlier work, Longsta¤ idiosyncratic e¤ects. This allows us to assess the contribution of all factors to the asset prices and returns. We specify the model in state-space form and estimate it with a Kalman …lter.
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The ABX.HE data have been examined in several studies of the …nancial crisis. Fender and Scheicher (2009) use two vintages to track the crisis and …nd that increased liquidity risk and decreasing risk appetite were important factors in the price decreases of the higher-rated tranches. Our paper di¤ers in many respects; we extract risk factors di¤erently and focus on the level rather than the change of the common factor. Longsta¤ (2010) uses the ABX indices to test for contagion from the subprime-asset backed market to other parts of the …nancial system. He …nds strong evidence of contagion and liquidity risk with revisions to risk premia identi…ed as the most likely transmission channel. Longsta¤ also …nds that ABX returns lead stock market returns and bond yield changes by up to three weeks, suggesting that signi…cant information was uncovered in this market that led to subsequent price changes in other markets. Gorton (2009) …nds that declines in the ABX indices and the repo market were highly correlated due to some combination of counterparty risk and lack of liquidity.
Our results summarize the behavior of subprime-mortgage backed securities in terms of four factors. In 2006, all factors have a discernible role in asset returns. The common factor becomes more important when the …nancial turmoil begins and has a larger e¤ect on AAA tranches than in the pre-crisis period. We examine the common factor's relationship with observable factors including real estate prices, the VIX index and interest rate spreads which re ‡ect the …nancial crisis. We …nd that liquidity and counterparty risk, as represented by the spread between the London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate, is su¢ cient to characterize the relationship between the common factor and the …nancial crisis as re ‡ected in interest rate spreads. We do a counterfactual analysis of the evolution of the common factor if the LIBOR-OIS spread had remained at pre-crisis levels throughout. We estimate that the common factor is 20 percent lower at the end of 2009 than it would have been if LIBOR-OIS had not been elevated during the …nancial crisis.
Likewise we estimate that the actual value of the REIT index is about 40 percent lower and VIX some 50 percent higher than in the simulated model with a stable interest rate spread.
The decreases in the common factor, decreases in the REIT index and increases of VIX are the estimated e¤ects of the elevated values of LIBOR-OIS during the crisis, not e¤ects of lower housing prices.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the ABX data and highlights its unique features which are re ‡ected in the econometric model presented in Section 3. The estimates of the factors are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 relates the common factor to observable short-term …xed-income spreads. Section 6 concludes.
Tracking the market for subprime mortgages
The set so the index trades at par -100 -at inception unless such a coupon exceeds 500 basis points, in which case the coupon is set at 500 basis points.
Each vintage of the index is based on twenty mortgage backed CDO deals created within the previous six months. For example, the ABX.HE 06-1 index is constructed from deals created in the second half of 2005. The issuers are the largest originators. 3 Strict requirements must be met to qualify for inclusion in the index. For example, the value of each deal must be at least $500 million and each tranche must have an average life between four and six years, and the AAA tranche must have a weighted average life of more than …ve years.
Furthermore, no security originator can have more than four deals included. Our initial analysis extracts a common factor from the behavior of daily ABX returns. 
Modelling framework for ABX data
Financial market returns are frequently modelled with latent factor models, for example by Diebold and Nerlove (1989) and Dungey and Martin (2007) . In this paper, we include four factors re ‡ecting vintage e¤ects in addition to the common, credit rating and idiosyncratic factors present in Longsta¤ and Rajan (2008) . The explicit di¤erences in ratings and vintages and the unbalanced nature of the data allow us to identify these four factors from the data 5 rather than applying factor labels ex post. The model is y i;j;t = i;j w t + i;j v i;t + ' i;j k j;t + i;j f i;j;t :
where y i;j;t is the demeaned return on the ABX index of vintage i and credit rating j at time t. The vintage is the date of issuance of the security. The factors represent a common shock a¤ecting all assets, w t ; a vintage shock unique to all assets of a particular index date, v i;t ; a ratings shock unique to assets of a speci…c rating across all vintages, k j;t ; and idiosyncratic shocks, f i;j;t :
To capture serial correlation in the data, the common, ratings and vintage factors follow AR(1) processes. As in previous research on factor models (Dungey, Pagan and Martin, 2000), we do not estimate persistence in the idiosyncratic shocks. The additional features of the model can be written 
E z;t = 0; E z;t z;s = 2 z for t = s for z = (v; i); (k; j); (i; j)
E z;t z;s = 0 for t 6 = s for z = (v; i); (k; j); (i; j)
E z;t ; a;t = 0 for a; z = (v; i); (k; j); (i; j) and a 6 = z
where equations (6) to (9) indicate that the shocks to each factor are independent with constant variances. There are no other restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of the returns. The conditional variances of the returns vary over time and we account for this feature of the data. Our state space model is already heavily parameterized and it is impractical to include ARCH estimation directly into the estimation of the factor model. Instead, we pre-…lter the returns by estimating an IGARCH(1,1) model and use the standardized returns in the factor model. 5 If we let y i;j;t represent these standardized returns and r i;j;t represent the raw (unstandardized) returns, then r i;j;t = a i;j + h i;j;t y i;j;t (10) h 2 i;j;t = 1;i;j (r i;j;t 1 a i;j ) 2 + 1 1;i;j h 2 i;j;t 1 : Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of the IGARCH models estimated by Quasi
Maximum Likelihood for all credit ratings and vintages (Lumsdaine, 1996) . Table 5 presents summary statistics for the adjusted returns and Figure 2 shows the adjusted returns. The graphs suggest that the IGARCH model has stabilized the variances relative to the variances in the original series.
The factor model can be rewritten in state-space form as
where Y t is the vector of the returns in each asset,
The evolving latent factors are contained in the vector t and the idiosyncratic factors, f i;j;t are contained in the vector " t .
To reduce the dimensionality of the estimation problem and keep it tractable, our empirical estimation is based on a system of nine asset returns selected to span the range of ratings and vintages. We examine AAA, AA and BBB-rated securities from the January . (14) De…ning as a 7 7 diagonal matrix of autoregressive parameters, = [ w v;i k;j ] for all i; j; S t as a 9 9 matrix with parameters i;j on the main diagonal; and R as the appropriately sized identity matrix where the factor variances are standardized to unity, we can estimate the parameters by the standard Kalman …lter procedure. 6 Its prediction equations are given by a t+1 = a tjt (15)
where P tjt+1 is the prediction vector. The updating equations are
where
Furthermore, we accommodate the unbalanced nature of our data by constructing a dummy matrix, D t , as follows D t = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 
Results
A preliminary yet informative way to analyze the results is to perform an unconditional variance decomposition using equation (1) which implies
so that, for example, the contribution of the vintage factor to variance in asset y i;j is expressed
i;j Var(f i;j ) and similarly for other contributing factors. Table 6 presents the unconditional variance decomposition for the full period of each vintage and for selected subperiods. 7 For the full period, the common factor is most important for the AAA and AA ratings for all vintages. Variability of the BBB-tranches is less closely related to the common factor and more closely related to the rating factor. The vintage factors are relatively unimportant for all assets. The ratings factors, on the other hand, a¤ect all of the vintages and credit ratings, although they are less important for the AA tranches of the January and July 2007 vintages. The importance of idiosyncratic factors di¤ers across vintages and across ratings. In particular, they exert a stronger in ‡uence on later vintages and we also observe an upward drift in terms of ratings over time. This likely re ‡ects the losses and consequent collapse in prices for the lower-rated tranches of the later vintages, which decimated the protection for the higher-rated tranches. As a result of the large losses, idiosyncratic losses on mortgages migrate up to the AA and even the AAA tranches. Table 6 and the following rows present the contributions of each factor to that volatility. Note that the common factor, shown in the second row, tends to be more important for the higher-rated tranches and the idiosyncratic factor tends to be more important for lower-rated assets. It is important to note that this is the variance decomposition for the standardized returns, not the raw returns. We discuss each of the factors in turn before delving more deeply into the relationship between the common factor with observables.
The common factor
The second row of Figure 3 shows the common factor becoming increasingly important over time compared with other factors. Its in ‡uence is negligible during the relatively tranquil conditions that characterized the …nancial system before early 2007. This is consistent with relatively low default correlations during this period and the low credit default spreads demanded for protection against default of the pooled assets. 
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CDO equity return variation.
Ratings and vintage factors
Both the rating and vintage factors exert a time-varying in ‡uence on asset return variability.
At various times, the speci…c rating and vintage helped to di¤erentiate between assets. For the earliest vintage, 06-1, ratings matter and this factor accounts for a non-trivial amount of asset return variability. For later vintages, ratings matter little for the two most senior tranches but continue to be an important determinant of returns for the equity tranche. In relative terms the contribution of the vintage factor is the smallest of all factors. However, in early 2007 as ABS markets become unsettled, the vintage factor has a pronounced e¤ect.
This suggests that market participants began to distinguish between ABX indices on the basis of the underlying asset quality. For all tranches the largest impact of the vintage factor occurs for the July 2007 issuance. The deals underlying this issue were struck in the …rst half of 2007, when US house price declines were already evident (previous issues were based on rising and then peak house prices).
The rating and vintage factors play an important role in distinguishing assets during non-crisis periods. However, during crisis, their in ‡uence is swamped by the common and idiosyncratic components.
The idiosyncratic factor
Just as the common factor exerts its greatest in ‡uence on the most senior claim, idiosyncratic shocks have their greatest e¤ect at the other end of the rating spectrum. In the earliest vintage, idiosyncratic risk almost exclusively a¤ects the BBB-tranche and were of little concern to holders of more senior claims because the lower-rated tranches absorbed these risks. In later vintages, there is a greater role for idiosyncratic shocks as mezzanine tranches also exhibit some vulnerability to them, most likely due to the inadequacy of the equity tranches to protect them. Interestingly, idiosyncratic shocks fall in importance for BBBrated assets, which may be due to overwhelming in ‡uence of the common shock or may also re ‡ect a lack of trades when the value of the BBB-tranche ‡attened out near zero. 9 The behavior of the idiosyncratic shock is consistent with the arguments outlined earlier.
In normal market conditions, when assets in the underlying pool exhibited relatively low correlation, idiosyncratic risk resulted in a few random subprime mortgage defaults whose e¤ects were absorbed by the equity tranche or other lower-rated tranches. The onset of the crisis in July 2007 led to this risk source being swamped by the common shock, limiting its impact on asset return volatility.
What drives the common factor?
Initially, we recover the level of the common factor. The logarithm of the value of the underlying asset, p i;j;t , for vintage i, credit rating j, in period t, from the adjusted return, y i;j;t ; accounting for GARCH is p i;j;t = a + h i;j;t y i;j;t + p i;j;t 1 (23) by the de…nition of the return and the equation for conditional heteroskedasticity (10) .The relationship between this index value and the factors can be seen by substituting for y i;j;t to write p i;j;t = a + h i;j;t i;j w t + i;j v i;t + ' i;j k j;t + i;j f i;j;t + p i;j;t 1 :
The contribution of the factors to the value of the assets can then be written as p i;j;t = a + i;j h i;j;t w t + i;j h i;j;t v i;t + ' i;j h i;j;t k j;t + i;j h i;j;t f i;j;t + p i;j;t 1 (25) where i;j h i;j;t w t is the contribution of the common factor to the value of the asset with vintage i and rating j in period t. Note that the common factor including heteroskedasticity is di¤erent for each tranche and vintage because di¤erent conditional standard deviations translate the adjusted returns into raw returns.
Section 4 showed that the common factor plays a major part in changes to the values of the most senior tranches of subprime-mortgage backed assets. We focus the rest of our analysis on the drivers of the common factor. We use the AAA tranche of the 06-1 vintage to construct the level of the common factor h i;j;t w t because it represents the highest valued CDO tranche for the longest period. 10 Figure 4 shows the integrated common factor with its level set to unity at the start of the series. 11 The evolution of the common factor can be usefully indicator of liquidity issues because the OIS rate is the rate for almost fully collateralized private transactions and the Treasury Bill rate is a nominal risk free rate. We also include the spread between the commercial paper rate on AA-rated asset-backed commercial paper and the U.S. Treasury bill rate, which can be interpreted as re ‡ecting ‡ights to quality during the crisis due to concerns about the value of the underlying assets. Table 7 , are consistent with one cointegrating vector between the common factor and the logarithms of the Dow-Jones REIT index and VIX. Table 8 presents a 3-variable Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) for the common factor, the logarithm of the REIT index and the logarithm of VIX. All equations include two lags of all variables. 12 One month interest-rate spreads for LIBOR-OIS, OIS-TB, and CPR-TB are included as exogenous variables. The errors are speci…ed as a diagonal GARCH(1,1) , estimated using a diagonal Vech structure. The zero restrictions on errors across variables reduces the number of parameters estimated.
13 Table 9 presents tests to restrict this set of equations by deleting spreads. The results clearly indicate that LIBOR-OIS is very informative for these variables. The results also clearly indicate that the CPR-TB is not informative and can be dropped at little cost. The OIS-TB spread is somewhat informative, with a p-value of 10.3 percent for dropping it from the equations with both other spreads but a p-value of only 20.5 percent when the commercial paper rate spread is not included in the equations. Overall, the results are consistent with the informativeness of the spread of LIBOR -OIS but not the other spreads. Table 10 presents the estimated three-equation VECM with LIBOR-OIS as the only spread. While t-ratios might suggest that LIBOR-OIS is not uniformly important, likelihood ratio tests indicate that each of the variables re ‡ects movements in LIBOR-OIS. 14 The estimates in Table 10 can be used as the basis for comparing actual events with events estimated without the behavior of LIBOR-OIS re ‡ecting the …nancial crisis. The no-…nancial-turmoil behavior of LIBOR-OIS from its behavior prior to the …nancial crisis.
It is relatively simple to date the …nancial crisis in terms of LIBOR-OIS. It spiked from 9.65 12 The choice of lag length is based on F-tests and Akaike Information Criterion values, reported in Table  9 , which support the reduction from 3 to 2 lags but not further. We also examined evidence for a VECM where spreads are treated as exogenous. For LIBOR less OIS in a four-equation system, the p-value is 13.4 percent. For LIBOR less OIS in a …ve-equation system, the p-value is 13.7 percent. These systems involve many parameters, so these results are at best indicative. Attempts to estimate a six-variable system with the AA asset-backed commercial paper rate were not successful. 13 While there always is variation in LIBOR-OIS, we simplify our simulation by setting LIBOR-OIS to its average value before the …nancial crisis and impose that value for the crisis period. We then simulate the behaviour of the common factor, REIT and VIX using the same innovations to those three variables as derived from the estimates in Table 10 Even if LIBOR-OIS returns to pre-crisis values, the cointegrated values of the common factor, the REIT index and VIX need not return to their pre-crisis values even though they will return to the cointegrated relationship. The estimated cointegrating vector suggests that it will take a long time for the variables to return to equilibrium and that the shocks to LIBOR-OIS re ‡ected in the common factor are likely to have permanently changed this factor in the wake of the crisis.
Conclusion
We characterize the behavior of the ABX indices of subprime-mortgage backed assets during the Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008. In the process, we gain a better understanding of the sources of the decline of this market, in particular the falls due to liquidity and counterparty risk. We apply a latent factor model to an unbalanced panel of returns by credit rating and vintage to obtain a measure of the common movement. The unbalanced nature of the data lends itself to identi…cation of four factors from the returns: a common factor, a vintage factor relating to the issuance dates of the securities, a credit rating factor and an idiosyncratic factor.
All factors exert a time-varying in ‡uence on the volatility of asset returns. The factor common to all tranches and vintages shows the most important change in variation over time. The common factor's in ‡uence on the highly rated tranches increases with the …nancial crisis, although not dramatically. This is consistent with market participants underpricing, and credit agencies underestimating, the coming …nancial di¢ culties. This of course is easier to see now than before the crisis. Given the structure of CDOs, the most senior tranches are quite vulnerable to the miscalculation of common risk. The increasing magnitude of common undiversi…able shocks changes the return behavior of AAA tranches dramatically as the crisis unfolds. As a result, the demarcation between tranches becomes blurred as assets within the underlying pool becoming increasingly correlated. Consequently, it is the common shock that is most closely associated with the main damage to the values of CDOs. As suggested by Coval, Jubek and Sta¤ord (2009), the securitization process led to more vulnerability to common risk that had been unimportant during the low volatility environment before 2007 but came to the fore with a vengeance during the subsequent downturn. At the other end of the spectrum, the role of idiosyncratic shocks in determining asset returns is predominantly associated with the lowest rated tranche, but even this is largely overwhelmed by the common factor after July 2007. Similarly, in the earlier tranquil market conditions, both the ratings and vintage factors are important for some tranches but again their in ‡uence is dwarfed by the common factor during the …nancial crisis.
To estimate the e¤ects of counterparty risk and liquidity di¢ culties in …nancial markets, we delve deeper into the origins of the common factor. We relate the common factor to observable variables commonly mentioned as being crucial in the initiation and transmission of the crisis, capturing the real estate downturn, general …nancial market volatility, market liquidity decreases and increasing counterparty risk. The common factor, the REIT index and VIX are cointegrated and related to the LIBOR-OIS spread. The LIBOR-OIS spread played a critical role. Because the spread was elevated during the crisis, at the end of 2009, the common factor was 20 percent lower, the REIT index was 40 percent lower and the VIX was 50 higher than without the disruptions re ‡ected in LIBOR-OIS. This of course does not imply that setting LIBOR-OIS to pre-crisis values would have reduced the e¤ect on the other variables. Fixing a price cannot help. On the other hand, our results indicate that macroprudential supervision is an even more di¢ cult task than commonly thought. A …nancial crisis has nontrivial e¤ects that continue well after it is over. This table presents summary statistics for all vintages and all ratings of the ABX index for all dates from inception to December 31, 1999. The left-skewness and excess kurtosis of the returns for vall vintages and ratings is evident. The correlations include all vintages and ratings available. The data for each vintage uses all available data available for computing the correlations across credit ratings. The parameters are estimates of the IGARCH equations for the returns r i;j;t r i;j;t = a + h i;j;t y i;j;t h where h i;j;t is the conditional standard deviation of r i;j;t and y i;j;t is the innovation in the return with zero mean and unit standard deviation. The table presents estimate parameters for all vintages and ratings. This tables shows summary statistics for the returns standardized for the IGARCH in the raw returns. There still is skewness and excess krutosis, although generally quite a bit less than in the raw returns. The parameters estimated for each of the three equations. The variable dlfw is the change in the logarithm of the common factor for the AAA tranche of the January 2006 vintage, dlreit is the change in the logarithm of the REIT index, and dlvix is the change in the logarithm of VIX. All interest rate spreads are based on interest rates with one month to maturity. LIBOR-OIS is the spread of LIBOR over OIS. OIS-TB is the spread of OIS over the Treasury bill rate. CPR-TB is the spread of the commercial paper rate on AA-rated asset-backed commercial paper over the Treasury bill rate. In addition to the 3 underlying variables in the cointegrating vector errorcorrection mechanism -the common factor, the reit stock price index and VIX -the variables included are Libor minus the overnight index swap (OIS) rate, Libor minus the Treasury Bill rate (which can be represented by OIS minus the Treasury Bill rate if Libor-OIS is included in the equations) and the AA commercial paper rate minus the Treasury Bill rate. The tests for lag length are based on estimates of the VECM with lagged values of the three spreads. The Akaike Information Criterion values are -17.9322, -17.9386 and -17.9241 for lag lengths of three, two and one, leading to a choice of the same lag length as F-ratios. The last test examines whether current values of Libor-OIS included in each of the three equations in the 3-variable ECM help to predict the three variables. 
07-2 Vintage
These are the returns adjusted for IGARCH(1,1) based on the estimates in Table 4 . The "06-1" vintage is the January 2006; the "07-1" vintage is the January vintage; the "07-2" vintage is the July 2007 vintage. The seemingly near-zero variances are periods of relatively low volatility. 
